Aristotle on the Apparent Goodepub,mobi,azw3格式电子书下载，作者：Jessica Moss-读书派

Aristotle holds that we desire things because they appear good to us--a view still dominant in philosophy now. But what is it for something to appear good? Why does pleasure in particular tend to appear good, as Aristotle holds? And how do appearances of goodness motivate desire and action? No sustained study of Aristotle has addressed these questions, or even recognized them as worth asking. Jessica Moss argues that the notion of the apparent good is crucial to understanding both Aristotle's psychological theory and his ethics, and the relation between them. Beginning from the parallels Aristotle draws between appearances of things as good and ordinary perceptual appearances such as those involved in optical illusion, Moss argues that on Aristotle's view things appear good to us, just as things appear round or small, in virtue of a psychological capacity responsible for quasi-perceptual phenomena like dreams and visualization: phantasia ('imagination'). Once we realize that the appearances of goodness which play so major a role in Aristotle's ethics are literal quasi-perceptual appearances, Moss suggests we can use his detailed accounts of phantasia and its relation to perception and thought to gain new insight into some of the most debated areas of Aristotle's philosophy: his accounts of emotions, akrasia, ethical habituation, character, deliberation, and desire. In Aristotle on the Apparent Good, Moss presents a new--and controversial--interpretation of Aristotle's moral psychology: one which greatly restricts the role of reason in ethical matters, and gives an absolutely central role to pleasure.

Vita Nova

09-12

收回昨天的话。还是有不少似是而非的论证。我真的喜欢不起来JM这样的作者，这本书读起来就跟Terence Irwin写柏拉图似的...

一事无成Midum

03-06

论证快乐在无论是理性还是非理性的欲求和行动的情况下作为apparent good的文本感觉太少了，第一部分实在是不够有力。。240305: 我觉得把feeling pleasant和apprehending good绑定在一起应该是对的但是延伸到phantasia可能就有点扯淡了；写akrasia可能是最有趣的

bare life

08-18

图书馆瞄了一眼带回来读，讲stoics中的亚里士多德，pleasure→phantasia→appearance of goodness→representation/desire(goal)，想从心理跨越到道德，感觉做irrationality的可以走这个justify自己